Algeria

No quantified unlicensed market size estimate is available from T1 or T2 sources — this is a confirmed gap in the evidence record. Growth trajectory is contracting: Law 25-10 (July 2025), a DURABLE primary statute, criminalises cryptocurrency and VPN use, closing the two principal residual access channels that had previously supported any informal market activity. The competitive landscape is a confirmed state monopoly with no private licensed operators. The FATF grey-list status confirmed ongoing as at the October 2025 plenary review further constrains any informal payment flows. For a private operator assessing market opportunity, the conclusion is unambiguous: there is no lawful addressable market, and the enforcement environment is actively tightening.

No licensing authority issues private gambling licences. No B2B licensing framework exists, confirmed at Confirmed confidence. The state-monopoly exceptions held by Pari Sportif Algerien and PMU Algerie are not accessible to private entities — these entities operate under Ministry oversight as state-owned monopolies, not as licensed private operators. There is no application process, no fit-and-proper test to satisfy, no capital requirement to meet, and no technical certification pathway to pursue, because the statutory framework does not permit private entry at any level. Law 25-10 (July 2025) further forecloses any informal entry via cryptocurrency or VPN-based access. The entry pathway assessment is structurally closed with no foreseeable change.

All private gambling marketing is banned under the Penal Code Articles 165 to 169, and Google has updated its Gambling and Games policy to prohibit all gambling advertising targeting Algeria — meaning the advertising-restriction dimension of player protection is enforced through both criminal statute and platform policy. No app distribution is permitted for private gambling. The player protection practical burden for a private operator is not a compliance calculation but a prohibition calculation: there is no compliant pathway through which a private operator could serve Algerian players.

Algeria's enforcement posture for gambling cannot be characterised with precision this cycle. No enforcement operation, prosecution statistic, payment-blocking order, or new enforcement-power instrument surfaced in T1, T2, or T3 sources during the research window. The enforcement-activity claim carries an Uncertain confidence tier, reflecting a structural coverage gap in a thin-record jurisdiction rather than an affirmative finding of inactivity. The absence of reported enforcement should not be read as tolerance or de facto permissiveness.

The liability framework for private gambling rests on the standing domestic prohibition, which is probable in characterisation — a structural inference from the consistent absence of any licensing instrument — rather than a Confirmed statutory citation. No T1 Journal Officiel citation for a primary gambling prohibition statute or criminal-code article was evidenced this cycle, meaning the precise legal basis of the prohibition and its penalty tiers cannot be described with Confirmed confidence. In a prohibition-family jurisdiction, the enforcement theory against private operators is grounded in the criminal prohibition itself: private commercial gambling falls outside any legal permission rather than constituting an unlicensed regulated activity.

No gambling-specific payment-blocking directive from the Bank of Algeria or the CTRF financial intelligence unit surfaced this window. The confirmed FATF grey-list status sustains enhanced-CDD obligations on DZ-linked correspondent-banking flows as a generalised financial enforcement layer, but this is not a gambling-specific instrument. Three material gaps — the absence of prosecution statistics, the absence of a gambling-specific payment directive, and the absence of a pinned primary statute — mean the enforcement-risk picture is incompletely characterised and should be treated as a risk-amplifying unknown.

The practical consequence for any DZ-linked cross-border flow — including any gambling-related payment activity — is an enhanced customer due-diligence obligation imposed on correspondent banks and payment processors engaging with Algerian counterparties. No gambling-specific AML instrument, STR or CTR threshold, or designated-reporting-entity framework for gambling operators surfaced in the structured claims this cycle. No primary AML statute citation was evidenced at T1.

The FATF grey-list status, while it was in force, represented the dominant and confirmed AML/CFT signal for Algeria, operating as a generalised financial-system friction rather than a gambling-sector-specific compliance regime; with Algeria's removal from the list on 19 June 2026, that particular enhanced-due-diligence friction layer no longer applies, though the practical burden for any operator attempting DZ-linked flows was elevated by this context while it was in force, independent of any domestic gambling-specific instrument.

State-monopoly entities PSA and PMU Algerie are subject to Ministry oversight and reporting obligations, but these frameworks are inaccessible to private entities. The ARPCE exercises domain-blocking powers under Law 18-05, which functions as an operational constraint on any operator attempting to serve the market rather than a compliance obligation. For service providers maintaining Algeria-connected flows, the operationally relevant obligation is enhanced due diligence arising from FATF grey-list status, confirmed ongoing as at the October 2025 plenary review. No app distribution is permitted for private gambling via Google Play or Apple App Store.

There is no private-operator GGR tax framework because no private operators are permitted. A 40% tax is levied on winnings from state-run games (PSA), withheld at source, with proceeds directed to charity and public-welfare/sports funds.

Not applicable — no licensed private gambling market exists, so there is no application or annual fee schedule for private operators.

Banque d'Algérie maintains tight foreign-exchange and capital controls. Law 18-05 exempts only sub-threshold cross-border e-commerce from FX formalities, and gambling is expressly excluded from permitted e-commerce, so there is no lawful gambling payment channel. Cryptocurrency was criminalised by Law 25-10 in July 2025, eliminating that workaround. Algeria's FATF grey-list status (October 2024, MENAFATF member) requires enhanced due diligence on all Algeria-connected flows.

An unlicensed market exists — players have historically accessed foreign gambling sites via VPN and cryptocurrency — but no quantified size estimate is available from T1 or T2 sources. Law 25-10 (July 2025) criminalises both cryptocurrency and VPN use, materially contracting the informal market by eliminating the two principal access channels. The competitive dynamics are therefore entirely shaped by the prohibition framework: the state-monopoly entities face no licensed private competition, and the unlicensed market is under active enforcement pressure following the July 2025 legislative tightening.

The 2025 crypto/VPN criminalisation signals a continued tightening trajectory on the gambling-prohibition side, independent of the FATF delisting.