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 Argentina · Question 10 of 11

# Enforcement: How hard does the regulator enforce?

Mixed · Probable · AI-generated · [Back to full Argentina report →](https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/argentina/)

Key section parameters

| Jurisdiction | Argentina (AR) |
|---|---|
| Regulator | Provincial Licensing Authorities (LOTBA / IPLyC / 24 sub-national regulators) |
| Favourability | Mixed |
| Confidence | Probable |
| Review status | AI-generated |
| Last collected | 18 Oct 2026 |

Summary answer

Enforcement against unlicensed gambling in Argentina escalated materially this cycle. A newly active specialised prosecutorial unit, FEJA, jointly coordinated with LOTBA to block six illegal online betting platforms within 48 hours in July 2026, grounded in Article 301 bis of the Código Penal de la …

## Full section analysis

Enforcement against unlicensed gambling in Argentina escalated materially this cycle. A newly active specialised prosecutorial unit, FEJA, jointly coordinated with LOTBA to block six illegal online betting platforms within 48 hours in July 2026, grounded in Article 301 bis of the Código Penal de la Nación, the statute criminalising unauthorised exploitation of games of chance. Separately, aggregate provincial reporting (probable confidence) indicates over 500 illegal betting sites were blocked during the 2026 World Cup wagering surge. Courts have also ordered payment processors to cease servicing named unlicensed operators, extending accessory liability under Article 301 bis to the payment layer of illegal flows. These are civil-law-pattern enforcement vectors: a primary licensing-offence statute paired with secondary blocking mechanisms, here judicially rather than administratively driven. The underlying provincial licensing architecture is unaffected; the change is in enforcement capacity and coordination, not in the legal framework itself.
