title: Belgium — Enforcement: How hard does the regulator enforce? | advennt.io canonical: https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/belgium/enforcement/ [Jurisdictions](https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/) [Belgium](https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/belgium/) Enforcement Belgium · Question 10 of 11 # Enforcement: How hard does the regulator enforce? Mixed · Confirmed · AI-generated · [Back to full Belgium report →](https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/belgium/) Key section parameters | Jurisdiction | Belgium (BE) | |---|---| | Regulator | Recorded in register | | Favourability | Mixed | | Confidence | Confirmed | | Review status | AI-generated | | Last collected | 18 Oct 2026 | Summary answer The Gaming Commission signed a cooperation agreement with DNS Belgium to improve detection of illegal gambling sites operating under '.be' domains, extending its enforcement reach against unlicensed distribution. This expansion in enforcement tooling occurs alongside a disclosed capacity constraint:… ## Full section analysis The Gaming Commission signed a cooperation agreement with DNS Belgium to improve detection of illegal gambling sites operating under '.be' domains, extending its enforcement reach against unlicensed distribution. This expansion in enforcement tooling occurs alongside a disclosed capacity constraint: the Commission's own opinion of 27 October 2025 states staffing at 32.8 of an 80-FTE target, prompting a risk-based supervisory approach that prioritises the largest operators by gross gaming yield. Smaller licensees may see less day-to-day supervisory attention in the near term, though the Duty of Care Charter and new IT-certification obligation apply across licence classes without an announced size-based carve-out. Belgium's enforcement theory for unlicensed operation rests on the statutory licensing stack established under the Gambling Act of 7 May 1999; the DNS cooperation agreement is a new secondary enforcement vector (domain-level blocking/detection) layered onto that primary statutory basis.