title: Croatia — Enforcement: How hard does the regulator enforce? | advennt.io canonical: https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/croatia/enforcement/ [Jurisdictions](https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/) [Croatia](https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/croatia/) Enforcement Croatia · Question 10 of 11 # Enforcement: How hard does the regulator enforce? Mixed · Probable · AI-generated · [Back to full Croatia report →](https://advennt.io/jurisdictions/croatia/) Key section parameters | Jurisdiction | Croatia (HR) | |---|---| | Regulator | Recorded in register | | Favourability | Mixed | | Confidence | Probable | | Review status | AI-generated | | Last collected | 11 Oct 2026 | Summary answer NN 72/2025 introduces a new statutory enforcement lever: withdrawal of the right to operate games of chance for non-compliance with socially-responsible-operation measures, referencing the Uredba o mjerama društveno odgovornog priređivanja (NN 129/25). This power carries Probable confidence from a T… ## Full section analysis NN 72/2025 introduces a new statutory enforcement lever: withdrawal of the right to operate games of chance for non-compliance with socially-responsible-operation measures, referencing the Uredba o mjerama društveno odgovornog priređivanja (NN 129/25). This power carries Probable confidence from a T1 source and is graded DURABLE. No named enforcement action — no fine or licence revocation — was located within this cycle's evidence to corroborate the power's use in practice; this is recorded as a coverage gap in the gaps register rather than an established absence of enforcement activity. The result is a jurisdiction with an expanded, durable enforcement capability whose practical application remains unobserved in the public record reaching this cycle, a pattern operators should treat as elevated latent risk rather than confirmed low enforcement intensity.